Introduction
Cornell University, like many other academic institutions in the United States, was severely affected by the economic downturn and the financial meltdown that began in 2008. In May 2008, the university had projected a balanced operating budget over the next few years. By the fall of 2008 the university realized that these projections were way off. A combination of declining endowments, declining gifts for current operations, declining support from New York State (four of its colleges received some support from the state), increased needs for borrowing to finance ongoing capital projects (because of the failure of projected gift flows for capital construction to materialize) and increasing financial need of its undergraduate students because of declining family incomes, left the university with substantial operating budget deficits. The administration quickly understood that corrective actions had to be taken and that the university needed to rethink its cost structure. While layoffs would likely be necessary, because of its role as a major employer in the community in which it was located and its commitment to its employees, Cornell hoped to minimize the number of layoffs that occurred and the administration had the idea of funding a one-time early retirement incentive program for staff to encourage a voluntary reduction in its level of employment.
Our paper uses administrative data from Cornell to try to develop an understanding of the factors that led Cornell employees to elect to participate in the program. Our focus is on answering two questions: First, in a decentralized large university setting where budget units face different financial situations, did differences in variables related to the financial situations of the units, namely reductions in operating budgets and recent layoff experiences, influence the probability that eligible non-union 1 employees chose to participate in the program? Second, did the program lead to adverse selection, in the sense that people who chose to accept the early retirement offer were those who tended to be of "above average productivity"? If the most productive staff were the ones who tended to accept the early retirement offer, the cost to the university in terms of lost productivity of the departing employees may offset the benefits of the program.
To preview our major findings, we find that employees' probabilities of accepting the early retirement offer were related to the budgetary pressures which they believed that their units faced. Moreover, while we cannot directly observe employee productivity, we can observe if employees were paid below or above average, given their personal characteristics, years of experience at Cornell, and job titles. We find a low value for this relative pay variable is a characteristic of the average employee Cornell chose to layoff in recent years. Furthermore, we find that employees who accepted the early retirement offer, on average, were paid less than we might expect given the above named variables.
To the extent that the university's annual merit increase system was working the way it should and relative salaries at the university reflect relative productivities, this suggests that adverse selection did not prove to be a problem. That is, there is no evidence that the "above average ability" employees were most likely to take the early retirement package.
B
Data and methods
B.1 Program details
To evaluate the impact of job-related risk factors that may influence non-tenuretrack staff's decisions to accept an early retirement program window offer, we use administrative data on all eligible non-union employees (n=1083) for the Staff Retirement Incentive (SRI) program at Cornell University. The SRI was announced to the University community on February 27, 2009 and was made available to all nontenure-track staff aged 55 or older, with at least 10 years of eligible service at the university as of June 30, 2009 , who received less than 25% of their salaries from sponsored research funds.
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The SRI only required employees leave a benefits eligible position at the university; employees "retiring" under the program were eligible to return to temporary non-benefits eligible positions and, after three years, to regular university employment.
The plan's incentives included a taxable lump sum payment equal to one year of base pay and a nontaxable contribution to a defined contribution retirement fund of 30% of base pay. Enrollment in the SRI was only available for a fixed amount of time;
employees were required to announce their intent to enroll in the program between March 
B.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our analyses make use of data from three sources. titles, and has relevance for compensation. Pay bands are defined pay ranges (minimum and maximum) for positions meant to encourage equitable pay across employees with similar expertise or duties. They are set at the university level and restrict management's discretion in setting pay. Higher pay bands typically reflect higher minimum, maximum, and medians for a pay range. Pay bands in our sample fall into two main classifications:
"banded" which consist of eighteen bands set by the university for staff positions, and "unclassified/academic/executive/" ones in which more flexibility is given management in setting pay than it had in the "banded" structure.
Our second source of information is on historical employee counts and layoffs. In what follows we exclude three individuals who held multiple jobs, three individuals for whom retirement plan data were missing or who were enrolled in a hybrid defined benefit/contribution retirement plan, and four individuals for whom 2006 salary data were missing, for a total of ten individuals.
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Our analysis thus uses a sample of 4 In results not shown in this paper we estimated models using FY 2010 budget information to test an assumption of rational expectations. The FY 2010 budget information was not available to the employees prior to accepting the SRI. These models were inconsistent across specification and seldom had precise coefficients. 5 One possibility for missing salary is that the individual was temporarily away from the university that year (for example a spouse of a faculty member accompanying the faculty member when he or she was on sabbatical). Eligibility for the SRI required 10 years of service, not 10 consecutive years of service.
1073 individuals. Approximately one-third of the non-union SRI eligible individuals chose to accept the retirement incentive.
Unfortunately, several potentially important variables are absent from our data.
We do not observe dependents, spouses, or partners in our administrative databases, but rather whether dependents, spouses or partners are covered by the employee's health plan.
We also do not observe spousal/partner or employee retirement wealth or health status.
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The first column of panel A of Bound, et. al. (1999); Brown (2000) and Dwyer and Hu (2000) showed that higher employee health is negatively correlated with the decision to retire while spousal health has a positive association with retirement probabilities. Stock & Wise (1990) and Samwick (1998) show that the present discounted value of future wealth from retiring at a given date is an important factor in retirement decisions. 7 Cornell also has campuses in New York City and Doha, Qatar. Only Ithaca employees were eligible for the SRI. Retirement age incentives appear in government policies and in employee benefit structures. The Internal Revenue Service specifies ages for minimum distributions and penalty free withdrawal of retirement funds, while the Social Security Administration specifies ages for receipt of full or partial Social Security benefits. Defined benefit pension plan structures also play a role by setting how annual pension benefits levels depend upon years of service, age at retirement, and a measure of average "final" salary.
For these reasons we might expect the relationship between SRI enrollment, age, and years of service to be increasing but non-linear. Indeed, Table 1 shows that individuals that enrolled in the SRI are on average 2.19 years older and worked 2.26 more years at Cornell, than individuals who turned down the opportunity to accept the retirement incentive offer. Further analyses reported below describe the non-linear relationship.
Having a dependent child on an employee's health plan is associated with not accepting the retirement incentive. This may reflect the age of the employee or that the employee has greater financial responsibilities that reduces the attractiveness of the incentive. Finally, on average, employees who accepted the incentive offer had lower levels of salaries and recent salary growth than employees who did not enroll in the program.
Differences in all of the factors mentioned above across employment units at the university may be responsible for the differences in enrollment rates across employment units observed in Panel B of Table 1 . For example, while 3.8% of eligible employees
were from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR), 6.3% of the employees who accepted the incentive offer came from this unit. In contrast, while 1.9% of the eligible employees came from Cornell's Law School (LAW), only 1.10% of the employees who accepted the incentive came from this unit. As such, we turn to a multivariate analysis to see if differences in acceptance rates across units still exist after we control for the characteristics of the eligible non-union eligible employees in each unit that are available to us in our data.
Appendix Table 1 In Figure 2 , we graphically display the coefficients (with two standard error bands)
that show the impact of the age, years of service, and employment unit dichotomous variables from Appendix Table 1 on the decision to accept the retirement incentive offer.
The acceptance probability increases monotonically with age at a decreasing rate until roughly ages 63 and over when it flattens out. The acceptance probability also increases In what follows we try to better understand this heterogeneity of enrollment rates among the employment units that persists even when conditioning on factors such as age, years of service, defined benefit, union status, and family characteristics. Specifically our focus is on individual's perceptions of their risk of being laid off and on whether they are paid less, or more, than average given their personal and job characteristics.
B.3 Econometric framework
We estimate models of the form y In the absence of an observable measure of actual productivity, it is common in the literature to obtain a proxy for productivity by making some comparison of salaries across individuals.
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If we can identify individuals who are performing roughly the same work and if we believe that the university's merit pay policies lead individuals' salaries to be roughly proportionate to their productivity, then we can use a measure of an individual's "relative" salary as a measure of his or her relative productivity. combined, equal more than the sum of the differences we observe individually.
C Results

C.1 Adverse selection
Employers relying on a labor force reduction tool that shifts the discretion of exit to the employee need to be confident that the "right" employees choose to enroll. The risk is that highly productive employees would be more likely to opt into the SRI since the probability of obtaining a position elsewhere could be a less risky and a more lucrative prospect for these individuals. If the employer loses highly productive employees they may also have lost substantial investments in human capital that it has made.
To evaluate if the "right" type of employees enrolled in the SRI, we proceed in two steps. First, we investigate whether a low value of our relative pay variable, the proxy for productivity, is associated with being laid off. Specifically, did the university, when it used the discretionary tool of a layoff choose to terminate employees with low relative pay? Second, we test for whether low relative pay is associated with the decision to enroll in the SRI.
To accomplish the first step we generate a new relative pay variable constructed from a combination of our SRI non-union eligible population with the population of 177 non-union individuals that suffered layoffs from January, 2005 to March, 2009. Layoffs for this population are for reasons defined as "lack of funds", "lack of work", or "reorganization". If low relative pay does indicate the "right" type of employee to enroll in the SRI we would expect that the employees laid off in these prior years were of lower relative pay.
14 To calculate the relative pay variables on the combination of these two populations a few adjustments are necessary. First, we convert the last annual equivalent salary received by the laid off population into a 2009 equivalent using the between year salary growth rate from our SRI population. Second, we increase the years of service of the laid off population to reflect the amount should they have been employed to 2009.
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Further, two variables, the statutory/endowed indicator (which we use to distinguish certain pay band differences within the AS and AP units) and the years since job entry date, are not available for our layoff population. Then, to construct this new relative pay variable, , we exclude those variables from the regression. We are confident that this does not materially impact a comparison between the new relative pay variable and the relative pay variable calculated exclusively on the SRI non-union eligible population.
14 Of course, the low relative pay could also serve as a proxy for something else.
15 Concerned that our method of adjusting the laid off population's salary and years of service could contribute to the distributional differences we observe, we also make the comparison using the following alternative method. Using the historic salary information from our SRI population, we separately compute a value for the relative pay variable for each year an employee was laid off. For example, employees laid off in 2006 will be included in a regression with the SRI population (at their 2006 salary and years of service) to compute a value for the relative pay variable. This method leads to very similar distributional differences between the relative pay variable for the laid off and SRI populations, with the gap in means slightly more dramatic.
The correlation coefficient between p and p conditional on our SRI non-union eligible population is 0.978.
In Figure 3 we show kernel density plots of p for the SRI enrollment population and the layoff population using the epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.17.
16
The density for the layoff population is shifted to the left with a mean of -0.29
while the SRI population is centered at 0.05. These means are significantly different with a t-statistic of over 3. There is observably much variation in the relative pay variable among the layoff population.
A possible explanation for this variation is that wide differences existed in how binding the sets of feasible employees under consideration for a layoff were for layoffs that occurred from 2005 to 2009. Although the university has discretion in choosing whom to layoff among workers not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, in effect it may be limited to selecting individuals from a pool attached to a particular project or program. We would anticipate that a reorganization would impose the lowest constraint on its behavior, while it is unclear whether a lack of funds for a position or a lack of work for an employee or group would be more binding on its actions. If funds are truly fungible a "lack of funds" might actually indicate an unwillingness of the university to make an allocation, perhaps because the set is not actually binding. Alternatively, a "lack of work" could imply an unwillingness of the university to reposition a valued employee, again indicating a non-binding constraint.
A further test then for the validity of the relative pay variable in serving as a proxy for productivity is to see how consistent it is with our expectations about how 16 The bandwidth chosen is the minimum of the optimal bandwidths of each density computed as the bandwidth that would minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were distributed Gaussian and a Gaussian kernel were used.
constrained each of the sets is above. It seems reasonable to assume that when using a layoff the university would want to minimize the average of the productivity lost. We will now evaluate how SRI enrollment is associated with the characteristic of low relative pay. Using our relative pay variable calculated only on the set of SRI nonunion eligible individuals, we estimate linear probability and logit models of SRI enrollment on relative pay and subsets of the variables previously included in Appendix Table 1 . The coefficients of the relative pay variable from each of the models are found in Table 2 .
The coefficient on relative pay is stable across specifications, ranging from -0.032 to -0.034 with little difference between the OLS and logit marginal effects. Standard error adjustments do not change the conclusions drawn. Our model suggests that a one standard deviation decrease in relative pay is associated with a 3.22% increase in the probability of enrolling in the SRI.
17 17 A final test for interpreting our relative pay variable as a proxy for productivity was to estimate its effect on eligible employees' decisions to accept the retirement incentive offer in a sample of eligible employees who were covered by collective bargaining agreements (most of this paper is focused on the non-union population, the large majority of staff at Cornell). Inasmuch as these agreements do not provide for merit pay increases, we might expect that the coefficient of the relative pay variable would be statistically insignificantly different from zero when we estimate the relationship between SRI enrollment and relative pay for this sample (if the relationship in the nonunion sample is due to relatively low productive non union employees enrolling in the SRI). While the coefficient for the collective bargaining sample was statistically insignificantly different from zero at the .05 level of significance, it was negative and its absolute magnitude was larger than the similar coefficient from the sample of nonunion employees reported in the text. The magnitude of this coefficient in the collective bargaining sample reduces our confidence
C.2 Job related risk factors
We suspect that employees consider a distribution of possible future employment durations at the university when deciding whether to enroll in the SRI. Their perceptions of being involuntarily terminated from the university in the future surely influences their decision whether to accept the incentive offer. In the remainder of our paper we include variables that may be indicators of future job-loss risk into the equations that predict whether an individual will enroll in the SRI. Our research design makes use of the units while the standard deviation of the difference for salary per employee over the same period is $4,000.
However, there are some drawbacks to using per employee budgeted resource or salary expenditure changes. A reduction in resources could indicate a reduction in facility expense or available supplies, or a failure to replace computers or peripherals and not actually suggest any immediate job loss risk to the employee. In this scenario, it might be that any effect we observe is motivated by a reduction in the quality of the employee's work environment and not from job loss related risk as we hypothesize. Our salary expenditure measure reflects the apportioned amount of resources available per employee and if it proves statistically significant, its effect may be directly due to job loss 
C.2.i Layoffs as indicators
In Table 3 we report linear probability model coefficient estimates and logit Looking first at the relative pay coefficients, their magnitudes are not significantly different across specifications and not significantly different from the estimates reported in Table 2 from models that exclude the layoff probability variables. Similarly, the coefficients on the layoff variables show little change across specification within each panel. Finally, the effect size on each layoff variable construction differs little depending on which average we choose. Using the layoff variable constructed from a four year average subject to the largest number of covariates, (Column (5)), the coefficient of 0.0181 implies that an increase of 5 layoffs per 1,000 employees is associated with a 9
percentage point increase in the probability of enrolling in the SRI. This suggests that employees were responding to perceptions of job-loss risk when deciding to accept the SRI.
C.2.ii Resource deviations as indicators
We estimated similar models to those shown in Table 3 This drop in effect size may reflect the limited time horizon employees consider when focusing on previous resource levels. Interpreting the coefficient on the one year deviation in resources reported in Column (5), a one standard deviation unit increase in resources of $15,000/employee is associated with a 3.3 percentage point decrease in the probability of enrolling in the SRI. The one year budgeted resource deviation provides more support that employees were responding to perceptions of job loss risk.
C.2.iii Budgeted salary expenditure deviations as a risk measure
Our final measure of job-loss risk is reported in Table 5 . Here we include three panels as in Table 4 Because the movements and levels of the budgeted resources and budgeted salary measures per employee are highly correlated (Figure 1 ) we might expect each measure to essentially produce the same impact on employee acceptance of the incentive. Results from Panel A suggest that an increase in budgeted per employee salary expenditures of one standard deviation ($4,000/employee) is associated with a decrease in the probability of enrolling in the SRI ranging from 3.3 to 3.8 percentage points -almost identical to the impact we reported above of a one standard deviation increase in the resource variable.
The one year budgeted salary expenditure deviation provides further support that employees responded to perceptions of job loss risk.
C.2.iv Do individuals of lower relative pay respond differently to jobloss risk and Does excluding individuals from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations Matter?
We have found that, on average, individuals with lower relative pay were more likely to accept the offer of the retirement incentive. A subsidiary issue is whether these lower relative pay individuals are more sensitive to the possibility of future layoff and thus more likely to weight such a possibility more heavily in their acceptance decision.
Panel A of Table 6 presents estimated coefficients from models that test if this occurs;
we estimate models in which we restrict the sample first to people with relative pay above the mean and then with relative pay below the mean. Recalling that the layoff and SRI acceptance rates for ILR were both much higher than for the rest of the university,
we further restrict the sample in Panel B, excluding employees from ILR, to see if excluding the relatively small number of employees from this unit influences our estimated coefficients.
Effect sizes between Panels A and B are very similar suggesting that our estimated relationships were not driven by the one "outlier" unit. Moreover, we are not able to reject the hypothesis that employees whose relative pay variable is below or above average react differently to layoff probabilities or other measures of unit financial stress in making their decisions whether to accept the retirement incentive offer.
C.2.v Does one indicator dominate?
Finally, in Table 7 we simultaneously include our layoff risk indicator with the resource variable in Column 4, and with the salary variable in Column 5, to better assess which effect is more important in employees' decisions whether to accept the retirement incentive. The effects of these variables when they were included in the model one at a time are shown in Columns 1 through 3 for comparative purposes. The coefficient on the layoff variable changes very little when either the salary or resource variable is also included in the model. In contrast, the salary and resource coefficients are approximately cut in half when the layoff variable is included in the model and their statistical significance is greatly reduced. These findings suggest that the disappearance of coworkers through layoffs is more relevant in a decision to accept early retirement than strictly financial indicators like resource or salary changes.
D Conclusion
The Cornell Staff Retirement Incentive (SRI) program helped the university to moderate the number of its employees that it subsequently laid off as it tried to restore its economic balance after the economic dislocation of 2008. We have provided evidence that employees' decisions to accept the incentive were conditioned on their perceptions of the economic stress that their units faced. In addition, to the extent that our relative pay variable is a proxy for employees' relative productivity, our results also suggest that adverse selection was not a problem for the university; on average it was the lower relative pay employees who accepted the retirement incentive offer. Murphy & Topel (1985) shown in brackets. Standard errors calculated using the method of biased reduced linearization proposed by Bell & McCaffrey (2002) shown in curly braces clustering on unit dummies. Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit. All models contain age, yrs of service, fulltime and academic staff dummies, gender and ethnicity, defined benefit, family characteristics, and salary change. Not included are relative pay or unit dummies. P-values indicated by: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Sample size is 1073. Robust standard errors shown in parenthesis for OLS with observed information matrix for logit. Employment unit codes are as follows: SS "Student Services", AP "Academic Programs", AS "Administration and Support", CALS "College of Agriculture and Life Sciences", AAP "Architecture, Art & Planning", ART "Arts and Sciences", ENG "Engineering", HOTEL "Hotel Administration", CHE "College of Human Ecology", ILR "Industrial and Labor Relations", JS "Johnson School", LAW "Law School", VET "College of Veterinary Medicine".
